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1 Introduction
Corporate lobbying has been a long-standing, contentious issue among schol-
ars, practitioners, and policy-makers. Despite the popular concern that pow-
erful corporations benefit from political favors through lobbying, the theoret-
ical and empirical research on this issue has not received as much attention.
Although the literature is replete with studies on campaign contributions, a
distinction between the two activities has not been clearly drawn, and comple-
mentary analyses on lobbying have been relatively scarce. The current paper
attempts to fill this gap by looking at the determinants of both campaign
contributions and lobbying expenditures and then measuring the returns to
lobbying as assessed by the financial market.
More specifically, this paper addresses two main questions: How do the
determinants of lobbying expenditures diﬀer from those of campaign contribu-
tions? How do lobbying expenditures pay oﬀ in terms of the firm’s financial
performance? Such a quantitative study can serve as a building block for
normative discussion on the public policy of lobbying regulation as well as
for the positive development of formal theories. Whereas the existing litera-
ture focuses mainly on special interest groups’ contributions through political
action committees (PACs) and the resulting electoral and legislative eﬀects,
the current paper documents lobbying expenditures and their eﬀect on firm
performance.
This paper employs a model similar to the Structure-Conduct-Perform-
ance (S/C/P) paradigm found in the industrial organization literature. Envi-
ronmental or structural forces aﬀect a firm’s political conduct, which in turn
aﬀects the firm’s performance. The first part of this article examines the
former link. I test the collective action theory together with two other com-
plementary hypotheses as determinants of political activities. The two main
findings are that free-riding and rent-seeking incentives are robustly relevant
for both types of political spending and that the firms’ management incentives
as well as economic hardship are also relevant for lobbying expenditures, but
not for campaign contributions.
The second part of this article explores the relationship between lobby-
ing and firm performance and tries to discern the causal relationship. Perhaps
the most straightforward measure that applies to a broad spectrum of indus-
tries and corresponds to the concept of firm performance is equity returns.
I estimate a panel model using three diﬀerent types of equity returns as the
dependent variables and lobbying expenditures as the main explanatory vari-
able. Using an IV method to correct for the endogeneity of lobbying, I find
some evidence that lobbying has positive and significant eﬀects on the firms’
equity returns. Moreover, the eﬀect is stronger relative to the market and less
so relative to the industry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly
mentions the relevant literature. The dataset is described in section 3. Section
4 examines the determinants of the two political strategies. Section 5 measures
the financial returns to lobbying. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There is an extensive literature in management, political science, and eco-
nomics on the determinants of corporate campaign contributions.1 Among
others, Grier et al. (1994) examined the determinants of PAC contributions
using 124 industries over five election cycles and found that industry con-
centration, government sales, regulation, antitrust indictments, and firm size
were important variables. Hansen andMitchell (2000) similarly examined PAC
contributions and the number of lobbyists using Fortune 500 companies. Nu-
merous other studies examined the patterns of political activities in various
industries.2
However, one of the criticisms of the traditional literature is that cam-
paign contributions are overemphasized and often confused with lobbying itself
when in reality “corporations spend an order of magnitude more on lobbying
activities than they do on soft money contributions or than their aﬃliated
PACs spend in campaign contributions” (Milyo et al. 2000). Brasher and
Lowery (2006) and Drope and Hansen (2006) are the most recent studies us-
ing the same lobbying expenditure data as that used in this paper.3 The
current paper adds to the literature by testing a larger set of hypotheses on
the antecedents of lobbying
The management literature often emphasizes the importance of non-
market strategies aimed at influencing government policies (e.g., Baron 2002,
Bonardi et al. 2005). One of the popular views is that the political market
works on the principles of supply and demand. That is, politicians need money
and information, and interest groups supply them in exchange for benefits.
1For surveys, see Hillman et al. (2004), and Potters and Sloof (1996).
2See, for example, Lichtenberg (1989), Schuler (1996), Kroszner and Stratmann (1998),
and de Figueiredo and Tiller (2001).
3Brasher and Lowery (2006) focus on firm diversification and economic conditions as
determinants of lobbying; Drope and Hansen (2006) show that the larger-firm sample bias
may not be a significant problem.
Numerous studies find political favors in terms of, for example, trade barriers
(Goldberg and Maggi 1999), academic earmarks (de Figueiredo and Silverman
2006), regulatory inspections (Gordon and Hafer 2005), and rate-of-return
regulation (Bonardi et al. 2006).
Others find political influence on the stock market. Fisman (2001) shows
the importance of political connections in the Indonesian stock market; Jay-
achandran (2006) finds that the U.S. equity market is aﬀected by the con-
trol of Congress; Knight (2006) shows that policy platforms are capitalized
in the equity prices. However, these studies use an event-study methodology,
which has a short time window around the specific events. The current paper
presents counterpart evidence using a longitudinal dataset, which provides a
more straightforward measure of the financial returns to lobbying.
3 Data Description
The S&P 500 Index’s constituent firms, as of December 2004, make up the
sample universe, where the sample horizon for most of the variables is from
1998 to 2004.4 This Index covers 80 percent of the U.S. capital market. Focus-
ing on these relatively large but representative firms is of particular interest
from a policy perspective because their political influence is of greater public
concern. Moreover, the results of the analysis are not diluted by the inclusion
of smaller firms. However, restricting the sample in this way carries its own
cost in that the findings may not be generalized.
The dataset is best described by following the S/C/P framework. First,
the structure consists of four groups of variables. The first group describes
the industry structure: concentration ratio, government purchase, and reg-
ulation. The second group captures aspects of management incentives and
control: CEO compensation, CEO incentive payments, and corporate gover-
nance. The third group measures the firms’ needs for protection: three-year
sales growth rates, lagged stock returns, and industry import share. Finally,
the fourth group includes control variables: sales volume, number of employ-
ees, diversification, and sector and year dummies.5
4Two recently incorporated firms are excluded from the sample because of too few ob-
servations.
5Sector is defined following the S&P’s Global Industry Classification Standard, which pro-
vides 10 sector classifications: consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, financials,
health care, industrials, information technology, materials, telecommunications services, and
utilities.
There are well-known diﬃculties in assigning industry characteristics to
the firms. An industry definition can be too large or too small; for example, GE
is a conglomerate operating in several industries. I use 1997 and 2002 census
data to construct industry characteristics as follows. For most of the firms,
I use the primary industry assignment given by Compustat, which is mostly
at the 6-digit NAICS level.6 Then, I evaluate each company’s profile using
Hoover’s and construct simple average data to assign industry characteristics
for the few companies that have a major presence in multiple industries.
Second, a firm’s political conduct is measured by its lobbying expendi-
tures, PAC contributions, and soft money contributions (all in logs). Lobbying
expenditure data are collected directly from the disclosure forms available at
the Senate. PAC and soft money contributions data are obtained from the
Center for Responsive Politics. Third, a firm’s performance is measured by its
equity returns. I consider unadjusted, market-adjusted, and industry-adjusted
stock returns for the dependent variable. All the financial data come from
CRSP and Compustat, where a small number of extreme values are excluded
as outliers.
The following descriptive statistics reveal some interesting patterns of
corporate political activities. There is a large variation in the level of firms’
political spending in the sample. Lobbying expenditures generally far exceed
campaign contributions. The correlation between PAC and soft money con-
tributions is 0.6, and the correlation between lobbying expenditures and the
combined contributions is 0.73. Although this correlation is relatively high,
it may be necessary to distinguish lobbying from contributions empirically as
well as theoretically.
Table 1 illustrates the variation in lobbying expenditures, sorted by the
S&P’s 10-sector classification. The second column shows average annual lob-
bying expenditures. The number of firms belonging to each spending category
is then counted. In the entire sample, 71 firms spend nothing, whereas 66
firms spend more than an average of $2 million per year. The mean of this
distribution is $957,000, and the median is $166,000 per year. The distribu-
tion also varies by sector. For example, firms in the telecom sector on average
spend a lot more than those in the IT sector.
Table 2 similarly shows the variation in the sample regarding the level
of campaign contributions. The overall mean is $119,000, and the median is
6Compustat also assigns 4-digit and 5-digit NAICS codes in some cases where appropri-
ate. The 6-digit NAICS level roughly corresponds to the 4-digit SIC level, which is most
commonly used in the industrial organization literature. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) has very high correlation with 4-digit SIC (and thus 6-digit NAICS).
Table. 1: Sector Lobbying Profile. Average annual lobbying expenditures
(in thousands of dollars) and the distribution of firms by sector and spending
category.
$27,000 per year. The sample firms are classified into four categories. A firm
is counted as Dem(Rep) if more than 70 percent of its total contributions goes
to the Democratic(Republican) party. Otherwise, it is classified as Balance.
Little counts the number of firms that spend less than $10,000 during the
entire sample period. The distribution of this classification shows the diﬀerent
political inclinations of the firms, that is, a partisan supporter, a balanced
donor, or a politically apathetic firm.
The last three columns of Table 2 show summary statistics. The first
one, (R−D)/(R+D), is a measure of partisan bias for which exactly balanced
contributions would produce zero (Tripathi et al. 2002). The all-positive num-
bers highlight funding asymmetry between the two parties. The next column
is the ratio of soft money to PAC contributions, which shows the importance
of both measures. The last column is the ratio of lobbying to combined con-
tributions. It indicates that lobbying expenditures are, on average, 6.67 times
larger than total campaign contributions in this sample.
4 Determinants of Lobbying
This section shows that there is a subtle diﬀerence between the determinants
of lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions. In addition to the vari-
ables previously identified in the literature, a new set of variables are used
to test the hypotheses which follow. Perhaps the most studied determinant
Table. 2: Sector Contributions Profile. Average annualized campaign contri-
butions (PAC and soft money combined) in thousands of dollars. The middle
four columns show the number of firms in each category. For the last three
columns, 88 firms are excluded to avoid zero denominators, and the median
values are shown. R(D) represents contributions to Republican(Democratic)
party.
of corporate political activities is the well-known collective action theory (Ol-
son 1965), which implies that firms in highly concentrated industries are more
likely to overcome the free-riding problem and engage in influence activities. In
fact, there are a myriad of studies, mostly using PAC contributions data, that
examine this hypothesis. However, the findings are mixed, and no consensus
has been achieved yet (see, e.g., Hansen et al. 2005 and references therein).
The logic of collective action is closely related to the firms’ rent-seeking
incentives (Tullock 1967). All other things being equal, a small number of
firms in oligopolistic industries may find it worthwhile to incur the costs of
influencing the government when the benefits from government procurements
or regulatory change far exceed the costs. That is, when the government is
a big purchaser from an industry or the industry is heavily regulated, the
industry’s stakes are higher regarding government action, part of which the
industry is willing to expend on influencing activities. Thus, the members of
such industries have more incentive to maintain collaborative lobbying eﬀorts
and discourage other members’ free-riding through monitoring.
Formally, the first hypothesis is that the four-firm concentration ratio,
the share of government purchases, and the regulated industry dummy would
have positive eﬀects on both the decision to lobby and the amount of spend-
ing. Due to its long-standing theoretical appeal, these traditional variables
are reexamined here. However, using a longitudinal dataset and including
other variables that capture complementary hypotheses would provide a more
reliable test that could gauge the relative explanatory power of the collective
action theory. In addition, by applying the Olsonian theory to lobbying expen-
ditures as well as campaign contributions, the findings could show its relevance
for diﬀerent types of political strategies.
The second hypothesis is concerned with the internal organization of
firms, especially the incentive of key decision-makers inside the firms. Whereas
the Olsonian theory largely abstracts from any individual firm heterogeneity
within industries, it seems plausible that diﬀerent styles of each firm’s man-
agement and governance aﬀect their political strategies. That is, firms in the
same industry may have diﬀerent propensities to lobby depending on how keen
their key executives are towards lobbying or how eﬀectively the shareholders
can constrain executive power. This view is complementary to the Olsonian
hypothesis in the sense that it can explain variation within an industry that
is not captured by the first hypothesis.
In fact, a number of authors have dealt with this organizational poli-
tics perspective of corporate political activities but with mixed findings (e.g.,
Sabato 1984, Boies 1989, Hart 2001). I propose another test of this sort using
the framework of management versus shareholder power. Indeed, if CEOs are
the initiators of political strategies, the prediction is that highly paid CEOs
are more likely to engage in lobbying if they expect lobbying to be benefi-
cial for their firms so that they can ultimately benefit from pay increases or
stock option exercises.7 Here I use two measures of CEO compensation–total
amount as well as share of stock-related payment–both of which are expected
to be positively correlated with lobbying.
However, an important consideration is the linkage between the CEOs’
incentives and the actual decisions that are reached. That is, even if the
key executives want to divert a firm’s limited resources into lobbying, they
should be able to do so. A corporate-governance index measures how much
the management can control a firm’s decision-making process in the face of
shareholder challenges. Strong shareholder rights can prevent lobbying if it
is deemed an ineﬃcient use of resources, but entrenched and powerful man-
agement can overrule and direct the resource flow. A higher value of the
Index used here represents stronger management and thus is expected to be
7Gordon et al. (2007) find a positive relationship between the executives’ incentive
payments and their campaign contributions along these lines.
positively correlated with lobbying.8
The third hypothesis is concerned with the firms’ need for protection.
This is an extended hypothesis originally drawn from the extensive literature
on trade protection (e.g., Hillman 1982, El-Agraa 1987, Schuler 1996). The
original protection theory says that a high level of import penetration would
make the aﬀected industries vulnerable because of increased foreign competi-
tion, and such industries would then turn to the government for protection.
The logic of this theory can hold more broadly. Namely, it suggests that a
firm or an industry that has experienced a decline in the recent past is also at
risk, so it may have an incentive to start or increase its spending on lobbying
activities in order to seek government protection.
The reason why firms in an expanding industry generally are less likely to
lobby is because potential entrants can cause free-riding problems (Grossman
and Helpman 1996), or a smaller firm size prevents them from borrowing
enough funds for lobbying from the capital market (Brainard and Verdier
1997). I test this hypothesis using two proxies that measure the firm’s recent
performance as well as import penetration rate of the industry. These proxies
are the firm’s past 3-year sales growth rate and the 1-year lagged stock returns.
If a firm’s sales volume or its market value decreases, it is a clear sign of
economic hardship, thus such firms are expected to lobby more just like those
firms that are adversely aﬀected by foreign imports.
However, there is a qualification to this generalization. That is, it may
not necessarily be the mediocre recent performance that triggers more lob-
bying; it could be that a firm engages in lobbying because it anticipates a
hardship in the near future. If this is true, then poor performance in the pre-
ceding periods may not be a significant determinant for the level of political
engagement. For example, Microsoft, which has been hugely successful, can
strengthen its lobbying activities in order to shield itself from likely antitrust
complaints. Thus, the eﬀects of past economic performance on the firms’
lobbying activities can be ambiguous; however, normally it is expected that
declining firms tend to lobby more because of the reasons given above.
Finally, there are important control variables that the literature has iden-
tified. The literature consistently finds that the firm size variable has a positive
and significant explanatory power in explaining PAC formation and contribu-
tions. The logic is that larger firms have more resources available, so that they
can aﬀord to hire top lobbyists or have a specialized lobbying team within the
firm. Another rationale is that large firms can benefit proportionately more
8This Index is originally from Investor Responsibility Research Center. See Gompers et
al. (2003) for the details of the particular corporate governance index used in this paper.
from the industry’s rent-seeking activities. However, the choice of sales rev-
enue as the usual firm size proxy seems rather ad hoc, so I use the number of
employees as well as the sales volume to see if the findings are sensitive to the
choice of the firm size proxies.
There is also a debate in the literature on whether more diversified com-
panies tend to lobby more. I measure the degree of firm diversification by
counting the number of its business segments. On one hand, diversified com-
panies may have more incentive to lobby because they are likely to encounter
more opportunities to exploit rents. On the other hand, they may have less
incentive to lobby because multiple issues tend to erode the economies of scale
and potentially conflict with each other.9 However, for large diverse companies
like the S&P firms, the former eﬀect is likely to dominate the latter, so the
expectation is that the firm’s size-related variables and diversification are all
positively related to the firm’s political activities.
The standard technique in this strand of literature is the Heckman se-
lection model. The reason why the selection model is typically used is because
the dependent variable is truncated at zero. That is, if firms have diﬀerent
underlying propensities to lobby, then spending is observed only when such
proclivity exceeds a certain threshold. It is well known that OLS estimates
are biased under this assumption, and the selection model yields consistent
estimates by including the hazard rate (lambda) as an additional regressor.
It also has the advantage that the estimates are obtained for both participa-
tion and expenditure equations. Table 3 presents the estimation results of the
selection model using the two-step procedure.10
Looking at the table, each column reports the estimation result of the
participation and the expenditure equations for the two dependent variables–
lobbying expenditures and total campaign contributions. The estimates of the
two equations show the eﬀects of each explanatory variable on the formation
of and the level of expenditure on lobbying. Note that, while lobbying data
is annual, contributions data are aggregated over election cycles, so the num-
ber of observations is smaller. The qualitative results presented in this table
are robust to various inclusions and exclusions.11 Interestingly, the hazard
rate (lambda) is not significant in the case of campaign contributions, which
9See, for example, Zardkoohi (1985), Grier et al. (1991), and Brasher and Lowery (2006)
for this issue.
10Likelihood estimation does not change any qualitative results of the table.
11Such exercises do not change any qualitative predictions, but there is an exception. It
appears that excluding some variables (e.g., CEO salary, employment size) makes the num-
ber of business segments statistically significant in both stages of contributions equations,
whereas in Table 3 they are not.
Table. 3: Determinants of Lobbying and Contributions. The dependent vari-
able in participation equation is I(y > 0), and it is log(1 + y) in expenditure
equation; N(lobbying)=3125(894 censored), and N(contributions)=1768(506
censored). Standard errors are in the parentheses. All figures are multiplied
by 100. **1%, *5% significance level.
suggests that the selection problem is not a significant factor for campaign
contributions.
The first three variables represent the industry structure, and I find
strong evidence that the collective action problem and the rent-seeking con-
cerns are important determinants of both lobbying and campaign contribu-
tions. The four-firm concentration ratio, share of government purchases, and
regulated industry dummy are all significantly and positively correlated with
the decisions to participate in and spend money on both types of political ac-
tivities. Thus, firms in a concentrated or regulated industry with government
procurement tend to become active lobbyists. This result is somewhat surpris-
ing given the mixed findings in the literature, and it may be due to the longer
sample horizon and the inclusion of other regressors used in this analysis.
The next three variables show some diﬀerences between lobbying and
contributing. While stronger management control has a positive and signifi-
cant eﬀect on the decision to lobby and contribute (but not on the amounts of
spending), only lobbying is positively and significantly related to CEO com-
pensation. This implies that, while entrenched management tends to initiate
both types of political activities, highly paid CEOs focus more on lobbying
than campaign contributions. This suggests that, if the CEOs expect a return
from the political investment, it is more likely from lobbying than from making
contributions. However, contrary to the hypothesis, the CEOs’ stock-related
payments do not have a significant eﬀect on the political activities.
The diﬀerence between lobbying and contributing also emerges in the
next set of variables where declining firms or industries are expected to lobby
more for protection. The firm’s past 3-year sales growth rate is indeed neg-
atively and significantly related to the decision to lobby and the amount of
lobbying, but not to campaign contributions.12 Import penetration has a pos-
itive eﬀect on the decision to lobby, but it has a negative eﬀect on its expen-
diture.13 In both equations, import penetration does not have a significant
eﬀect on campaign contributions, which again suggests that contributions are
not directly aimed at gaining political benefits. However, the 1-year lagged
12One reason why distressed firms may increase lobbying expenditures rather than cam-
paign contributions could be that lobbying is directed to the Congress and the federal
government, which is in a position to deliver political favors, whereas campaign donations
are made to the candidates, who may or may not succeed in the election and thus their
promises are less certain from the firm’s perspective.
13An interpretation of the diﬀerent result in the two equations is that, while high import
penetration triggers initial lobbying, increasingly high levels of imports can actually dis-
courage lobbying because firms may give up their protection strategy and instead adapt to
the global economy.
stock return has no eﬀect on either type of political activity.
The last set of control variables (i.e., sales, number of employees, and
diversification) only partially validates previous findings. That is, the sales
volume without doubt has positive and significant eﬀects in all stages of lob-
bying and contributing. However, when proxied by the size of employment, the
firm size is negatively related to lobbying. Why these two diﬀerent firm-size
proxies yield diﬀerent results is an open question, but it may be that a large
number of employees can form an organizational power within the firm that
can constrain the management’s ineﬃcient lobbying decisions. The number of
business segments has significant and positive eﬀects in lobbying equations,
but it is not significant for campaign contributions.
5 Returns to Lobbying
This section aims to serve as a preliminary step toward quantifying the fi-
nancial returns to lobbying. Empirical studies measuring the returns to the
lobbying firms, especially in terms of the financial returns, seem scarce, and
there are few formal theories that can guide the selection of appropriate em-
pirical counterparts. Although the literature is ripe with research on how
lobbying changes voting behavior in the legislature, how such changes in the
political arena feed back into the lobbying firm’s performance has yet to un-
dergo extensive empirical scrutiny. As this paper was being written, Chen
et al. (2008) were independently studying the eﬀects of lobbying on a firm’s
accounting profits as well as stock returns.14
The approach of this section is of an exploratory nature, which sheds
some light on this issue. The main hypothesis is that lobbying has a positive
eﬀect on a firm’s financial performance. The most commonly used measure of
firm performance is its stock returns. Hence, I use the firms’ equity returns as
the dependent variable and the lobbying expenditures as the main explanatory
variable of interest, together with a set of control variables. The premise here
is that a firm would make an investment only if that investment yields higher
returns than alternative investment opportunities. Thus, an investment in
lobbying ought to be associated with positive returns; otherwise, it would be
a puzzle why firms would make such investments.
14The diﬀerence is that they find significant eﬀects of lobbying on stock returns without
instrumenting the lobbying expenditures. However, they also show the positive returns to
lobbying by comparing the portfolio returns of firms with high lobbying intensities versus
non-lobbying firms.
To begin with, pooled OLS regressions result in insignificant correlation
between the amount of lobbying and the firms’ equity returns, which is a ro-
bust finding for various OLS specifications. Given that equity prices follow
something like a random walk, it seems diﬃcult indeed to show that lobbying
can explain some of the stock price movement. OLS estimates, however, suﬀer
from such problems as attenuation bias and simultaneity bias, so the insignif-
icance result might be misleading. Attenuation bias is something to worry
about in this dataset if the firms’ lobbying expenditures were not reported
accurately. This could cause a downward bias in the OLS estimates, which
could make the coeﬃcients spuriously insignificant.
More importantly, a misspecification may arise due to the endogene-
ity problem in the following sense. If more profitable firms tend to lobby
more, then lobbying expenditures is an endogenous variable (i.e., lobbying
is correlated with unobserved heterogeneity), and the coeﬃcients cannot be
consistently estimated by OLS. In such cases, an instrumental variable tech-
nique would yield consistent estimates through plausible exclusion restrictions.
Thus, I use two instruments for lobbying expenditures. The first instrument
is the average lobbying expenditures of all the other firms in the same sector
excluding each firm one at a time. This is a valid instrument if stock returns
are not highly correlated across firms, which seems reasonable for the sample
firms.
The second instrument is a set of campaign contributions measures: con-
tributions to the Democratic party, its interaction term with the Clinton ad-
ministration dummy, contributions to the Republican party, and its interaction
termwith the Bush administration dummy. This choice of instruments is based
on the recent theoretical development of the complementary roles of multiple
political strategies (e.g., Hillman and Hitt 1999). Schuler et al. (2002) show
that firms tend to combine campaign contributions and lobbying to gain ac-
cess to politicians. One such view on the complementarity between the two
primary political tactics is that contributions buy access so that lobbying can
influence the policies.
That is, the access-influence hypothesis says that contributing and lob-
bying are complementary activities in that contributions can only buy access
to the legislator’s door and lobbying is aimed at bringing in policy changes
(e.g., Wright 1990, Austen-Smith 1995, Tripathi et al. 2002). Politicians have
limited time to meet lobbyists, so the lobbyists might be able to signal the im-
portance of their case by making campaign contributions. Humphries (1991)
and Langbein (1986) provide some empirical evidence that contributions are
indeed used to buy more contacts with politicians. As Thomas Downey (D-
New York) said, “Money doesn’t buy . . . a position. But it will definitely buy
you some access so you can make your case.”
If indeed lobbying is ultimately responsible for delivering information
to politicians and benefiting in exchange from policy concessions, then con-
tributions are purely access oriented. That is, contributions do not have a
direct eﬀect on the firm’s performance, but only make the firm more eligible
for lobbying. In this way, contributions may not be correlated with the er-
ror term in the equation for the firm’s stock market performance. This fits
well into the instrument selection guide–an instrument is a variable that in
loose terms aﬀects the endogenous variable but does not directly aﬀect the
dependent variable other than through its eﬀect on the endogenous variable
in consideration.15
Another important issue in the empirical specification is which measure
of equity returns should be used as the dependent variable. This is related to
the nature of the political returns, and it would aﬀect the interpretation of the
results in a subtle way. Individual firm returns are the most straightforward
benchmark, but the estimation would then answer how lobbying pays oﬀ to
individual firms without any regard to other firms in the same or diﬀerent
industries. That is, a positive coeﬃcient on lobbying would mean that lobbying
increases the firms’ equity returns in a noncompetitive way–all firms in the
market can benefit from lobbying, perhaps at the expense of the smaller firms
or the consumers.
On the other hand, individual firms’ equity returns can be adjusted
relative to the market or industry averages. I therefore consider two additional
measures. One is the individual firm’s returns minus the S&P 500 Index
returns, and the other is the individual firm’s returns minus industry portfolio
returns.16 In the former case, a positive coeﬃcient on lobbying would mean
that a lobbying firm can outperform the average firm in the entire market.
Compared to an unadjusted benchmark, this case introduces the possibility
of competition for government resources between diﬀerent industries in the
market. That is, lobbying can benefit an industry at the expense of another,
although it may still benefit all firms in the same industry.
In the latter case, each firm’s returns are adjusted relative to the industry
15It is legitimate to still question why this is a good instrument. However, given that there
is no obvious alternative or quasi-experiments in the real world, the benefit here seems to
outweigh the cost.
16In this section, industry refers to the French and Fama’s 49-industry classification. I
match the sample firms each year with one of the 49 industry portfolios created by French
and Fama. The 49 industry value-weighted portfolio returns are then subtracted from the
individual firm returns.
Table. 4: Returns to Lobbying. Standard errors are in the parentheses.
N=1883. **1%, *5% significance level. See the Appendix for the first-stage
estimation.
portfolio to which it belongs. This case can address the strongest competition
element among the three dependent variables considered here because a posi-
tive coeﬃcient on lobbying would mean that a lobbying firm can outperform
the average peer in the same industry. Such a view on lobbying as a private
good or arms race is consistent with Lichtenberg (1989) and Gray and Lowery
(1997), who argue that, rather than being an industry public good, lobbying
can yield firm-specific returns about which other firms in the same industry
are indiﬀerent or which they may oppose. Thus, the three dependent variables
can shed light on the public versus private nature of lobbying.
Since lobbying eﬀorts continue over the Congressional sessions and the
goals of the lobbyists are most likely to be achieved before the elections, I use
the election-year samples only (i.e., 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004) in the following
analysis.17 As a first step of the regression with a panel data model, Gen-
eralized Least Squares estimates are presented in the first three columns of
Table 4 for later comparison. Then I employ Baltagi’s (1981) Error Compo-
nents Two-Stage Least Squares model (EC2SLS) to control for the endogeneity
of lobbying expenditures by using an IV method as explained above. I also
include sales, corporate governance, and concentration as control variables.18
Table 4 shows the GLS and EC2SLS estimates at the same time in
which the three diﬀerent dependent variables are used in each column, that is,
17Using both on- and oﬀ-election year samples indeed yields weaker returns to lobbying.
18It is well documented that smaller firms tend to have higher equity returns (e.g., Banz
1981). Recent findings also suggest that corporate governance and concentration ratios may
also aﬀect equity returns (Gompers et al. 2003, Hou and Robinson 2006).
unadjusted, market-adjusted, and industry-adjusted stock returns. The GLS
estimates of the coeﬃcients on lobbying are all positive but insignificant. The
coeﬃcients are highest for unadjusted returns and lowest for industry-adjusted
returns. Thus, it appears that returns to lobbying are the weakest in the sense
that they would realize private benefits at the expense of the rivals in the
same industry. Rather, the payoﬀs seem to come from mainly distinguishing
one industry from another or promoting some common business interest as a
whole.
The IV estimates show a similar pattern, but interestingly the coeﬃcient
estimate increases fivefold in magnitude for unadjusted returns, eightfold for
market-adjusted returns, and sixfold for industry-adjusted returns, all of which
now become significant. These are huge jumps and may uncover the financial
returns to lobbying that OLS estimates are unable to capture because of the
reverse causality problem discussed above. The estimates are quasi-elasticities
of lobbying expenditures on equity returns. For example, it means that dou-
bling expenditures on lobbying can increase the firm’s equity returns by 2.5
percent unadjusted, 2.4 percent relative to the market, and 1.3 percent relative
to the industry.
Sometimes it is useful to test whether a theoretically endogenous variable
is statistically also endogenous. The Hausman test provides a well-known test
of the exogeneity of the variable, but this test does not directly apply to
EC2SLS. Thus, I instead use regular IV estimation without error components
and test the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the lobbying expenditure variable.
This null is rejected in the market-adjusted returns case, but the null is not
rejected in the other two cases.19 This suggests that the instruments used here
may not be perfect and caution must be exercised in using these estimates.
In other words, both GLS and EC2SLS results should be considered, and the
finding appears inconclusive.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the determinants of lobbying expenditures and campaign
contributions and presents some preliminary findings on the financial returns
to lobbying. Firms in concentrated and regulated industries tend to engage
more in both types of political activities. Highly paid CEOs and a declining
sales trend additionally seem to facilitate lobbying, but not campaign contri-
butions. This suggests that lobbying is more responsible for gaining political
19p-value (market-adj.)=0.01, p-value (unadj.)=0.16, and p-value (industry-adj.)=0.28.
favors than are campaign contributions. In terms of equity returns, lobbying
firms tend to outperform the market average and, to a lesser degree, the av-
erage peer in the same industry. This suggests that lobbying has both public
and private good nature, but the former eﬀect is larger than the latter.
7 Appendix
7.1 Basic Panel Dataset (1998-2004)
Concentration. The four-firm concentration ratio of the assigned industry as
discussed in the text (Census Bureau).
Regulation. An indicator variable for 13 regulated industries out of the 49
French-Fama industry classification (expert opinion).
Government purchase. The share of the government consumption expenditures
and gross investment in the total industry output (Census Bureau).
CEO compensation. The sum of salary, bonus, and all other, inflation-adjusted,
in log (Compustat and SEC).
CEO incentive pay. The share of the sum of restricted stock, stock option,
and long-term incentive payouts in the total salary and bonus
(Compustat).
Governance. Corporate Governance Index, where a larger value indicates
stronger management (Andrew Metrick).
Sale growth. Last three year’s least squares sales growth rate, using quarterly
or monthly data (Compustat).
Import share. The ratio of import value to the total industry output (Bureau
of Economic Analysis)
Sales. Net sales, inflation-adjusted, in log (Compustat).
Employees. Number of employees, in log (Compustat).
Business Segments. Number of product/service lines, operation and
geographic segments (Compustat and Hoover’s).
Lobby. Annual lobbying expenditures, inflation-adjusted, in logs (U.S. Senate).
PAC contributions. Contributions from a PAC to federal candidates over
two-year election cycles (1997—2004), inflation-adjusted, in logs (Center
for Responsive Politics).
Soft money. Soft money contributions from a company, its subsidiaries, and
its aﬃliated groups and individuals, inflation-adjusted, in logs (Center
for Responsive Politics).
Individual returns. Firm-level annual stock returns, monthly-compounded
stock returns over a year (CRSP).
Industry returns. Annual value-weighted industry portfolio returns of the 49
industry portfolios (Kenneth French).
Market returns. S&P 500 Index returns (Compustat)
7.2 Notes on Data Collection
Although the Lobbying Disclosure Act provides a useful dataset, the data are
not without shortcomings. It applies only to the federal level, and disclosure
at the state level is subject to varying state laws. Focusing on federal lobbying
may be sensible for the sample firms because they operate at a national level.
Some critics say that the disclosure is not properly audited, and I do not use
1996 and 1997 data partly because the initial compliance rate was not stable
until the 1998 Technical Amendment. Occasionally, there are a few missing
files, which seems to be due to a change in personnel. Since the dataset is
relatively small, I chose to fill in 14 missing cases when it was obvious that the
amount must be the same as the previous six months’ spending.
A firm can just indicate that it has spent "less than $10,000." I recorded
it as $0 when the "no lobbying activity" box was checked or no lobbying issues
were reported, otherwise, I recorded it as $10,000. Most sample firms file their
disclosure as a registrant, which includes payments to contract lobbyists. How-
ever, some firms do not file themselves, in which case I added up the income of
all the contract lobbying firms to estimate the firm’s expenditure. Company
profiles such as name changes and mergers must be followed up when searching
the disclosure files, which is also the case with campaign contributions. The
general rule is to trace the corporation that matches the share identification
number of the S&P Index.
7.3 First-stage Estimation
Table. 5: First-stage Estimation of EC2SLS in Table 4.
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